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The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC):
Towards a Supraregional Scale of Governance in the
Greater Region SaarLorLux?
Estelle Evrard
Institute of Geography and Spatial Planning, University of Luxembourg, Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg
ABSTRACT
All over Europe, EGTCs (European Grouping for Territorial
Cooperation) are mushrooming. Between 2006, when the EU
regulation entered into force, and 2014, 51 EGTCs have been
established. Conceived as a legal tool to facilitate cross-border,
interregional or transnational cooperation, the EGTC was
established after years of lobbying from cross-border organisa-
tions. Apart from practical guidelines mostly dedicated to the
legal possibilities and limitations of this tool, few academic
studies examine the significance of this tool for cross-border
governance as such. This paper develops such a perspective,
using the case study of the Greater Region SaarLorLux,
(Lorraine, Luxembourg, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland and
Wallonia), where two existing EGTCs are operating. The EGTC
INTERREG IV A Greater Region is the only EGTC managing an
EU programme; the EGTC Secretariat of the Summit supports
the main political organisation in this area. This contribution
argues that the EGTC tool can facilitate the emergence of a
supraregional scale of governance. This paper examines how
this instrument allows the institutionalisation of a cross-border
entity in terms of its capacity to embody and perpetuate the
cross-border region, and to implement its strategy. It then
applies this conceptualisation to the specific context of the
Greater Region. The empirical analysis shows that although
the two EGTCs institutionalise the cooperation, they are rather
conceived as administrative and operational tools. The paper
concludes with possible explanations of such a mismatch
between the potential of this tool and the effective use of it.
Setting the Scene
Since the 1970s and even more intensively since the 1990s, cross-border areas
have institutionalised their cooperation; the Euroregion is the most iconic
institutional setting of this wave.1 This trend is intrinsically linked to growing
functional interdependencies2 and the multi-level governance setting struc-
turing the EU regional policy.3 Scholars agree that despite the EU integration
process, cross-border cooperation areas are “far from being regions in the
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juridico-political sense”.4 They “do not appear particularly successful in
constituting new, transnational scales of governance”.5 Two main reasons
hinder their capacity to act as a whole.6 First, their organisation as transna-
tional policy networks does not support the establishment of a common
capacity.7 Actors consequently remain oriented towards their own region,8
having difficulties in conceiving and coordinating a common development
strategy.9 Second, cross-border areas face the challenge of political legitimacy:
they are not governed through territorially based popular representation10
and have difficulties in effectively reaching “the minds and hearts of ‘ordin-
ary people’”.11
“In order to overcome the obstacles hindering territorial cooperation”, the
EU instituted a legal tool “for the creation of cooperative groupings in
Community territory”.12 Since then, European Groupings of Territorial
Cooperation (EGTC) have mushroomed all over Europe; 51 are currently
operating.13 Despite several unclarified aspects, lawyers have emphasised the
uniqueness of this instrument.14 First, the EGTC is the only EU instrument
with legal capacity aiming especially at facilitating territorial cooperation.15
In comparison, Euroregion is a fuzzy type of cooperation since it does not
benefit from a unified status established by the EU or other international
organisations.16 When a Euroregion is institutionalised with legal capacity
(usually through an association), this legal status remains regulated under
national law, thus hindering its cross-border action.17 With its legal capacity,
the EGTC can sign contracts, establish its own budget, recruit staff and
implement projects on behalf of its members. Second, in contrast to the
legal frameworks developed under the auspices of the Council of Europe,
sub-state authorities as well as nation-states can be members of an EGTC.18
This possibility is crucial for cross-border cooperation areas involving small
states without a regional level of governance (e.g., Luxembourg).19 Third, the
EGTC’s ultimate goal is intended to support territorial cooperation, either
with or without implementing EU projects and programmes.20 In addition to
these legal analyses, a number of practical handbooks have been published
for practitioners.21 Some academic studies have analysed the EGTC under
the lens of the multi-level governance paradigm,22 emphasising how this tool
empowers cross-border regions “to circumvent/supersede the national level
through a process of negotiation and ‘alliances’”.23
The aim of this contribution is to focus on cross-border governance, inves-
tigating whether this instrument facilitates the emergence of a “new, transna-
tional scale of governance” and thus changes the picture presented earlier.24 If
the EGTC does not have an impact on the political legitimacy of cross-border
cooperation, it provides a legal framework that creates a cross-border legal
entity.25 The EGTC is capable of embodying and implementing tasks on behalf
of its members.26 Against this backdrop, we question not only how the EGTC is
used as a legal tool, but first and foremost how this new room for manoeuvre is
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interpreted and used by actors in their cross-border strategies of power bar-
gaining. What does this mean for the construction of cross-border regions?
This analysis is anchored within a two-step reflection. First, we concep-
tualise the emergence of a capacity embodying the whole cross-border
cooperation as a process contributing to the institutionalisation of a region.
‘Region’ is understood as “a process which, once established, is continually
reproduced and gradually transformed in individual and institutional
practices”.27 Four interacting stages institutionalise the region: “1) assump-
tion of territorial shape, 2) development of conceptual (symbolic) shape, 3)
development of institutions, and 4) establishment as part of the regional
system and regional consciousness of the society concerned”.28 Without
claiming a direct affiliation with this conceptualisation, an extensive body
of literature has investigated, albeit in a rather differentiated manner, how
these different stages contribute to shaping cross-border regions. Scholars
have analysed how cross-border actors spatially delimit ‘their’ cooperation
area,29 thus providing a general understanding of the institutional mechan-
isms underpinning the definition of cross-border territorial shapes.
Bordering processes initiated in cross-border spaces remain on the research
agenda.30 In the same vein, numerous institutional analyses have extensively
listed the existing cross-border institutions,31 providing information on both
the conceptual shape and the development of institutions in European cross-
border spaces. As to the ‘conceptual shape’, scholars have demonstrated the
ambivalence of the border as a vehicle for both identity and territorial
marketing.32 Cross-border institutions have also been analysed from a legal
point of view,33 as well as from a political science and geographical point of
view.34 Some studies have also analysed the process through which cross-
border regions are perpetuated in time and space, investigating in particular
their interaction with ‘their’ citizens. With this contribution, we aim to
demonstrate how institutions play a crucial role in embedding and perpetu-
ating the region in the cross-border context. Most institutional settings (e.g.,
Euroregions) provide an interregional framework and “rules of the game” for
the cooperation between cross-border actors. They institutionalise a platform
framing the negotiation between institutional partners and the emergence of
a common position. The effective implementing powers for common projects
rely on the institutional partners, thus hampering the emergence of the
region as a whole. The EGTC represents the first EU instrument, which on
the one hand allows the institutionalisation of a cross-border common
institution that is legally recognised by the EU and member states’ laws35
and on the other hand confers implementing powers on such an entity. It
thus contributes towards embedding the construction of the region in one
common independent institution, implementing a common vision and strat-
egy. In this sense, this institution can support and perpetuate the conceptual
and territorial shapes of the cross-border region in construction.
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Second, we conceptualise the progressive emergence of a cross-border
capacity to construct and perpetuate the region as a ‘supraregionalisation
process’. We follow Häkli in thinking that “the established levels of authority
[the local, the regional and the international] have all emerged interdepen-
dently as part of the territorial governmental order in modern societies”.36
Consequently, “transnational scales . . . are produced and reproduced in
processes that set alternative perimeters to networks of co-operation between
actors who seek strategic advantage from this co-operation”.37 Cross-border
cooperation results from the complex interrelation of European integration
and the “hollowing-out” of certain functions of the nation-states.38
Accordingly, this contribution first conceptualises the significance of
supraregional cooperation and analyses the extent to which the EGTC can
be analysed as a tool supporting the emergence of such cooperation. This
analytical framework is then set against the tasks and roles conferred on two
EGTCs currently operating in the cross-border area of the Greater Region
SaarLorLux, which comprises Lorraine, Luxembourg, Rhineland-Palatinate,
Saarland and Wallonia. The EGTC managing authority for the INTERREG
IV A Greater Region programme – the only one of this kind in the EU – was
established in 2010 and was given rather technical functions. The EGTC
Secretariat of the Summit of the Executives, created in 2013, is directly
involved in the political cross-border cooperation, since it institutionalises
the highest political institution of this area, which has existed since 1995. We
underline the fact that both EGTCs are given rather technical and opera-
tional tasks, leaving the power to structure and implement the cooperation at
the regional level. We conclude with possible explanations for such a mis-
match between the potential of this tool and the effective use of it.
Conceptualising the Supraregional Institution
Before providing a definition of the supraregional institution, we suggest
going back to some crucial specificities that explain the current prevalence of
interregional cross-border cooperation.
A cross-border cooperation area is “a territorial unit that comprises con-
tiguous sub-national units from two or more nation-states”.39 Yet, according
to international law, the ability to interact across borders is limited to nation-
states.40 Lawyers commonly agree that sub-state authorities from different
member states can cooperate within the extent of their competences.41 This
has two major implications, the first relating to law and the second to
political science. Since sub-state units can cooperate only within their respec-
tive set of competences, the extent of the cooperation is circumscribed to the
sum of competences that the institutions involved have in common (“the
lowest common denominator”42). In this context, depending on each coun-
try’s constitutional setting, the institutions involved have asymmetric
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competences (“multi-level mismatch”43). In federal countries, federated states
have a wide range of competences (e.g., German Länder, Swiss cantons)
while sub-state authorities have, in (de)centralised states, limited sets of
competences. The nation-state or its representatives’ authorities (e.g.,
French prefecture) are therefore involved in the cross-border cooperation,
thus increasing the number of possible partners and blurring the map of
competences. This institutional mismatch has been depicted as one of the
most obstructive barriers to cross-border cooperation.44
The other side of the coin relates to political science. Because no legal
order provides an a priori definition of the legal relationships between sub-
state authorities, these face an “institutional ambiguity”.45 In such a context,
actors determine their own sets of rules and the political process consists in
negotiating them.46 Cross-border cooperation can accordingly be portrayed
as a “kleine Außenpolitik” [‘mini foreign policy’]47; it is a form of non-
codified foreign policy. Sub-state authorities progressively negotiate and
define common “rules of the game”,48 outlining the extent, the purpose
and the routine of their cooperation. Logically, sub-state authorities asso-
ciated in a cross-border context ensure that they are equally represented and
associated within the entire decision-making process (‘interregional coopera-
tion’), from the political decision down to its operational implementation in
each (sub)-state authority. (Sub)-state units engage in such cooperation
following common good will, which de facto fluctuates over time. The
effective implementation of common decisions can also vary between
partners.
In this context, the concept of “supraregional institution” depicts a
common institution with legal capacity to implement the decisions of the
involved cross-border (sub)-state authorities. In doing so, it institutiona-
lises, represents and perpetuates the cross-border region. This concept
results from a comparison with the European integration process, which
triggers a “spill-over effect”,49 characterised by different phases. The most
integrated of these is the construction of a sui generis legal order, inde-
pendent from the member states’ own legal order.50 As a result of this
integration process, a supranational political system emerges, having deep
implications not only at supranational but also at nation-state and sub-
state levels. We understand the emergence of a cross-border level of
governance (through institution-building processes) as being closely inter-
twined with the European integration process.51 Conceptualisations ana-
lysing supranational institutions can accordingly be applied to the
emergence of the transnational level of governance. Supranational institu-
tions have been widely analysed both in political science and law52; two
concepts are particularly illuminating for the cross-border context. First,
the emergence of a supranational political system results from a
continuum.53 In the cross-border context, we place emphasis on the process
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through which institutions progressively structure and perpetuate the
cross-border region. Second, the concept of decisional supranationalism
emphasises the “institutional framework and the decision-making process
by which Community policies and measures are, in the first place,
initiated, debated and formulated, then promulgated and finally
executed”.54 Three criteria are identified: 1) the independence of the
institution (e.g., independent staff, budget), the decision-making process
(e.g., quality majority voting) and the execution of measures directly
undertaken by the institution or under its supervision.55
Applying these conceptualisations to our analysis, interregional cross-
border cooperation is characterised by the pre-eminence of and the bal-
ance between each (sub)-state authority, from the negotiation of common
rules of the game at the political level, through the decision-making
process, to the implementation of decisions by administrations.
Interregional cooperation is a policy field directly driven by and dependent
on (sub)-state authorities. While keeping the balance between (sub)-state
authorities, cross-border supraregionalisation is a process through which,
besides them, a cross-border institution embodies and perpetuates the
cross-border region in construction. It represents the interests of the
cross-border region as a whole. In contrast to interregional cooperation,
supraregional cooperation relies on rules of the games institutionalised
through a legal agreement conferring certainty and continuity on it.
Applying the criteria identified by Weiler in this context, cross-border
supraregional institution(s) conduct the activities that have been conferred
on it with 1) independence (e.g., legal capacity, own staff) while 2) the
decision-making process includes majority voting. The supraregional insti-
tution 3) implements the tasks that cannot be handled solely by the
authorities involved. Since they hold the political legitimacy, (sub)-state
authorities remain the only decisional body in a supraregional setting.
However, the cross-border institution plays a crucial initiative role; it
implements the cross-border project for the whole area, consequently
contributing to embodying and perpetuating the cross-border cooperation.
These definitions are operationalised in Table 1. Since cross-border suprar-
egionalisation is first and foremost a process, a cross-border institution
can therefore, within its structuring process, at the same time cover
interregional and supraregional elements. Depending on the stage of
cooperation, elements of inter- and supraregional cooperation may coexist.
Because of the legal specificities of the EGTC tool (e.g., legal personality),
this instrument de facto locks in the institutionalisation of the cooperation.
The decisional capacity of (sub)-state authorities regulates the impact of these
legal provisions; they can decide to speed up, limit or restrain the institutio-
nalisation process. The following section investigates how the EGTC institu-
tionalises the cooperation (third column of Table 1).
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The EGTC, a Tool for Establishing a Supraregional Institution
At this stage, a preliminary remark is needed. Despite the support of numer-
ous lawyers for creating a European law regulating cross-border
cooperation,56 the complexity of such an endeavour and the reluctance of
some member states (‘paradiplomacy’ being a key reason57) encouraged the
EU to opt for a more pragmatic way. The EGTC regulation represents a
compromise: first, this framework can support the management of EU
funds58 as the Commission insisted. Second, it answers some of the key
claims (e.g., legal personality) made by lobbying organisations (e.g.,
Association of European Border Regions59) without actually developing a
new section in European law dedicated to territorial cooperation. The EGTC
indeed creates a European legal tool, the application of which, however, relies
on national law.60 The major advantage of this compromise is third to avoid
any interference with the member states’ own division of competence
between the state and the regional level and to leave them full authority to
decide on how provisions shall be implemented. For example, centralised
countries (e.g., France, Italy) have one implementing provision while feder-
ated states make their own provisions in Austria, Belgium and Germany.
Fourth, each member state keeps its individual imprint at least at two stages:
when transposing the regulation into national law, and when approving an
EGTC involving sub-state authorities on its territory.61 The latter was one of
the main bottlenecks during the negotiations.62 Member States have a power
to exercise ex-ante control, meaning that “the Member States must allow the
participation in an EGTC, unless certain conditions are not fulfilled” while
the commission makes sure to “pay close attention” to the way the regulation
is implemented.63
This situation has two major consequences. Given the political support of
the EU for EGTCs, cross-border areas may also use this instrument to
increase their visibility on the European map, without however bypassing
the nation-states. Then, while this regulation has the advantage of providing
a unified framework for territorial cooperation, the transposition into
national law might lead to a fragmentation of cross-border cooperation
standards.64 For example, while the new member state Croatia showed
great interest in this regulation and transposed it quickly, national provisions
are still missing in some federated states of Austria, Belgium and Germany.65
In France, the very specific legal status of the EGTC (syndicat mixte) is
deemed unfortunate.66 Paradoxically, when establishing an EGTC, (sub)-
state authorities should launch a comparative law study to select the most
favourable law under which the EGTC in preparation should be governed.
Despite these formal challenges, three aspects of the EGTC regulations
contribute directly to institutionalising the cross-border cooperation, thus
providing the ground for constituting a transnational scale of governance to
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which (sub)-state authorities steer their efforts when establishing a cross-
border strategy. First, conferring legal personality67 on the EGTC is one of
the main novelties; it contributes also directly to its autonomy. It has its own
budget,68 may employ staff, launch and answer calls for tenders, and parti-
cipate in projects relating to territorial cooperation.69 In return, it is liable for
its debts.70 Second, the regulation provides a general orientation on how
the EGTC shall function (with a convention71) and organise itself (with
statutes72). Each EGTC shall also have an assembly (gathering of its mem-
bers) and a director representing it.73 When establishing an EGTC, (sub)-
state authorities de facto institutionalise their cooperation, moulding their
own “rules of the game” into the EU and national frameworks. From “kleine
Außenpolitik”, where rules of the game are essentially political, (sub)-state
authorities set up a legally binding agreement between themselves. With staff
and tasks, the EGTC embodies the cross-border cooperation, whereas under
a strict interregional cooperation it is embodied in a network where each
individual member’s core activities are primarily relating to a (sub)-state
authority. In this latter situation, the cross-border cooperation is in the
background of numerous attributions. The institutionalisation process locks
in a process where one institution embodies the cooperation and is in charge
of specific tasks in order to conduct and concretise it. If such a framework is
less flexible, it also implies obligations and rights for each member, thus
providing an element of “certainty” to the cooperation and leaving aside the
“institutional ambiguity”.74 Third, a set of tasks is devoted to the EGTC.75
The regulation mainly defines two criteria to delimit the effective tasks that
an EGTC may undertake. On the one hand, an EGTC aims at “facilitat[ing]
and promot[ing] territorial cooperation to strengthen Union economic,
social and territorial cohesion, and the overcoming of internal market
barriers”.76 This broad definition opens a wide spectrum of possible tasks
to be undertaken by an EGTC. At the same time, this provision implies
positioning the EGTC vis-à-vis the EU regional policy, even when it is
financially independent. This situation reinforces the “branding” trend,77
where (sub)-state authorities are encouraged to identify their endogenous
potential,78 develop their own strategy.79 Establishing an EGTC is one way to
“get on the map”. On the other hand, a crucial question relates to the extent
of the tasks that an EGTC can be given by its members. If it is clear that an
EGTC “shall act within the confines of the tasks given to it . . . and falling
within the competence of every member”, can (sub)-state authorities be
members without having the same set of competence as the other members?
The member state whose member is not competent for all the tasks specified
in the convention shall approve its participation80 and has therefore a role of
arbitration in respect of applying its own constitutional law.81 This rather
technical consideration is crucial: under the control of the member states, it
allows (sub)-state authorities to have asymmetric sets of competences to
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create an EGTC. If it were otherwise, the added value of this regulation
would have been largely undermined. It provides the opportunity for sub-
state authorities having limited sets of competences to be part of such
cooperation without limiting its extent (e.g., Francophone and German-
speaking communities in Belgium, mostly competent for language and edu-
cation). This provision confirms the gatekeeper role of the member states
that can draw the limits of such cross-border cooperation. The practical
interpretation of this provision will be crucial for the effective extent of the
cooperation. All in all, this tends to demonstrate that when associating (sub)-
state authorities with wide-ranging sets of competence, the EGTC can be
institutionalised, for example, to implement a common cross-border strategy
or to run infrastructure projects (e.g., the Cerdagne cross-border hospital at
the French and Spanish borders which involves authorities from municipal,
local and national levels).82
Following our definition of supraregional institution, the EGTC regulation
on the one hand ensures the autonomy of the cross-border institution. It also
sets the ground for empowering the EGTC with specific tasks to be under-
taken for the cooperation as a whole and for ensuring its external representa-
tion. The EGTC can thus play a key role in executing measures on behalf of
the cooperation. Nevertheless, this regulation is rather neutral when it comes
to the decision-making process that can remain unanimous, while a suprar-
egional institution would imply some majority voting. This regulation there-
fore triggers the institutionalisation of the cross-border cooperation without
automatically leading to a supraregional institution. It remains to be seen
how (sub)-state authorities will use this institutional room for manoeuvre
and whether they will confer capacity-building to a common cross-border
institution. In the next section, we analyse how this framework is implemen-
ted in the Greater Region.
The Greater Region SaarLorLux: Halfway Between “Kleine
Außenpolitik” and Supraregionalisation?
During the last 150 years, the cross-border region currently known as the
Greater Region was often the focus of unwanted international attention, and
of the last European wars.83 In the 1950s, while the European community for
steel and coal came into being, SaarLorLux played an important role on the
map. Its homogenous economic profile of the “coal and steel triangle”84 was
its living reality until the crisis in these sectors in the 1960s and 1970s.85 The
past difficult economic reconversion explains the nowadays contrasted pic-
ture (structural change to the dynamic finance sector in Luxembourg, and to
some extent to the automotive sector in Lorraine and Saarland).86 The
Greater Region is currently well known by border scholars: on the one
hand for being the largest European cross-border area of cooperation,87
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and most notably, on the other hand, for having the most significant con-
centration of cross-border commuters (213,400 persons in 2013).88 The
resulting diverse functional interdependencies encouraged the (sub)-state
authorities to set up a common strategy in 2008, labelled “Metroborder”
(cross-border polycentric metropolitan region).89 The “Summit of the
Executives”90 is the driving force behind this strategy; it is also the main
political institution of the region.91 Created in 1995, it gathers the highest
political representatives of each associated (sub)-state authority and works on
the basis of a two-year rotating presidency. This setting is unique in Europe,
since it brings together a nation-state (Luxembourg), three federated states
(Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland and Wallonia), two federated political com-
munities (German-speaking and Francophone communities in Belgium) and
four decentralised authorities (Prefecture of Lorraine, Lorraine Region,
Meurthe et Moselle and Moselle local authorities, Figure 1).
The effectiveness of the cooperation relies upon a three-step procedure
involving systematically each individual partner, and therefore being strictly
interregional:
● Together, the political representatives of the (sub)-state authorities
involved meet and take decisions on the content and extent of the
cooperation. This gathering legitimises the common decision and the
cross-border cooperation as a whole (kleine Außenpolitik);
● Thematic working groups gathering together administrative represen-
tatives of each (sub)-state authority concretise the political decision;
● Each (sub)-state authority implements the decision (operational
implementation).
This setting, involving many (sub)-state authorities, having their own poli-
tical agendas and election rhythms, makes the cooperation challenging.
Representatives from (sub)-state authorities openly acknowledge a lack of
continuity between the successive presidencies.92 In this cooperation scheme,
where rules of the game rely upon each (sub)-state authority’s own staff,
cross-border projects are punctually financed either by all members or by
INTERREG projects. As in other cross-border regions, some (sub)-state
authorities regard the INTERREG programme as one way of operationalising
“their” own cross-border projects, while others place emphasis on the
European source and purpose of this funding scheme. This ambivalence is
inherent in the INTERREG programme.93 Recently, (sub)-state authorities
have set up two EGTCs, whose features are compared in Table 2. The first
EGTC undertakes the role of managing authority of the INTERREG IVA
Greater Region programme.94 The second EGTC institutionalises the coop-
eration undertaken within the framework of the Summit, conferring on it a
budget, staff and slightly changing the “rules of the game”.
12 E. EVRARD
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [E
ste
lle
 E
vr
ard
] a
t 1
5:2
1 2
5 F
eb
ru
ary
 20
16
 
Fi
gu
re
1.
Au
th
or
iti
es
as
so
ci
at
ed
w
ith
th
e
G
re
at
er
Re
gi
on
Su
m
m
it
of
th
e
Ex
ec
ut
iv
es
.
GEOPOLITICS 13
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [E
ste
lle
 E
vr
ard
] a
t 1
5:2
1 2
5 F
eb
ru
ary
 20
16
 
Table 2. Main Characteristics of the EGTCs in the Greater Region
GECT – INTERREG Programme Greater Region1
GECT Secretariat of the Summit of the Greater
Region2
Main Characteristics
SEAT Metz (FR), Prefecture of the Lorraine region Esch s/ Alzette (LU)
APPLICABLE LAW French Luxembourgish
MEMBERS All members depicted in Figure 1 All members depicted in Figure 1
(including Meuse département as a full
member, Vosges département is not
member)
(except Meuse and Vosges départements)
LANGUAGES German and French
Degree of Autonomy
DATE OF CREATION
AND DURATION
1 April 2010 28 Aug. 2013
Until the closure of the INTERREG IV A
programme, extended until the end of 2015
Indefinite duration
ROLE Managing authority of the INTERREG IV A
programme (2007–2014), as defined by the
EU structural funds regulations
Administrative secretary of the Summit,
coordination of its presidencies and
organisation of its working groups
BUDGET EU structural funds Budget shared between the members
STAFF Bilingual staff (independent of the members) recruited to support the implementation of
the activities
EXTERNAL
REPRESENTATION
Ensured by the members and the president
(Prefect of the Lorraine Region, acting in the
name of the EGTC and representing it)
Not yet clear from the convention and
statutes. Either the rotating presidency
(changing every two years) or the staff
Decision Making
DECISION-MAKING
BODY
General assembly gathering all members
DECISION-MAKING
PROCESS
Decisions are taken by a unanimous vote for
all questions
Each territorial component (Lorraine,
Luxembourg, Rhineland-Palatinate,
Saarland, Wallonia) has four votes.
Decisions are taken by a majority of three
territorial components (gathering eleven
votes or more, art. 13.1, statutes)3
Execution of Measures
DIVISION OF
LABOUR
Management board gathering
representatives from all members and the
director in charge of the “administrative
daily management of the managing
authority” of the programme (art. 17)
The EGTC ensures the secretariat of the
Summit and the coordination of the
Summit’s Presidency (art. 2, statutes)
Each member is responsible for
implementing the decisions in its entity
IMPLEMENTATION
OF PROJECTS
The EGTC is only in charge of the managing
authority of the INTERREG IV A Greater
Region programme
The manager (member of staff) assists the
president (rotating presidency) and
ensures the daily management of
administrative and logistic activities (art.
14, statutes)
1Information in this column is based upon ‘Règlement grand-ducal du 11 décembre 2009 autorisant l’Etat du
Grand-Duché de Luxembourg à adherer au groupement européen de cooperation territoriale (GECT)
“Interreg-Programme Grande Région” et approvant le projet de convention relative audit groupement et
le projet de statuts de celui-ci’, Memorial Journal Official du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg A 243 (Dec. 2009)
pp. 4345–4360.
2Information in this column is based upon ‘Arrêté grand-ducal du 30 juillet 2013 autorisant la creation du
Groupement européen de Coopération territoriale (GECT) “Secrétariat du Sommet de la Grande Région”’,
Memorial Journal Official du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg A 155 (Aug. 2013) pp. 2999–3016.
3Nonetheless, for the following questions, decisions are taken by a unanimous vote: accession of new
members (article 9.2), the loss of membership quality (article 10), exclusion of a member (art. 11), budget
(art. 18), change of statutes (article 19) and dissolution of the GECT (art. 20).
Source: own elaboration.
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When comparing the EGTCs’ features to the definition of supraregional
institution presented earlier (Table 1), one notices their very limited degree
of autonomy. Despite the fact that both EGTCs have legal capacity, their
own budget and staff, their role remains limited – at least from the way it is
formulated. A managing authority plays a central role for the effective
administration of an INTERREG programme, but it is mainly executive,
excluding any initiative. Apart from the European visibility that it confers
on the Greater Region (the only EGTC of this kind in Europe), one can ask
about the effective added value of the EGTC tool, since the managing
authority’s role is clearly defined in the EU regulation and the managing
authority is, by definition, an authority with legal personality. The EGTC
Secretariat of the Summit’s role is also formulated in a rather restricted
manner; it is its “administrative secretariat” and the daily business is taken
care of by a “manager”. In respect of the institutional context presented
earlier, this EGTC aims first and foremost at establishing a permanent
body acting as a conveyor belt between the decision-making process and
the working groups’ implementation.
As to the decision-making process, members of each EGTC take the
decisions gathered in an assembly in both cases. Decisions are taken unan-
imously in the case of the EGTC INTERREG while majority voting is the rule
at the EGTC Summit. This latter element represents the most visible “power
twist” to be observed in this particular case. It institutionalises five “territorial
components” (each corresponding to one of the territorial entities of the
Greater Region). The decision-making process is also simplified, with the
majority voting procedure for matters relating to the daily management of
the EGTC, thus avoiding blocking positions. This rather technical provision
also addresses directly the “multi-level mismatch” and the important number
of members. This voting procedure de facto encourages members of the same
territorial component to act in concert prior to the cross-border assemblies,
in order to be stronger in the negotiation at cross-border level. This rein-
forces territorial components having only one member (Luxembourg,
Saarland and Rhineland-Palatinate). This voting procedure shifts the multi-
level mismatch from the cross-border interregional cooperation level back
towards each territorial component itself. This could encourage each terri-
torial component to design its own common strategy and vision for the
cross-border cooperation as a whole. Under the pretext of respecting the
institutional setting of each (sub)-state region, both majority voting and
working with territorial components were hardly discussed a couple of
years ago.95
As to the implementation of projects, both EGTCs conduct tasks on
behalf of their members, thus allowing a transnational scale of governance
to emerge, both at the level of decision (assembly of the EGTCs) and at the
level of the operational implementation (EGTCs’ staff). In the case of the
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EGTC INTERREG IVA, this is nonetheless not new, since it undertakes the
usual management structure of an INTERREG operational programme. It
nevertheless changes slightly the picture presented earlier as to the EGTC
Summit which institutionalises further its functioning at the decisional level
(voting procedure) and at the operational level (common staff implementing
the Summit’s presidency priorities and following up the working groups). In
both cases, the EGTC is used as an operational tool to facilitate the coopera-
tion between its members; it is not yet used to increase the visibility of the
cooperation to the citizens. The presidency is held by one of its members,
hence conferring a rather strong political backing on these institutions,
whose tasks are mostly administrative and operational. It reveals the mem-
bers’ willingness to keep their imprint on the daily cooperation and to carry
out the functions of external representation.
In addition, interviews96 conducted in 2011, while (sub)-state authorities
were negotiating the establishment of the EGTC Summit, demonstrate that
the EGTC is first and foremost interpreted through the very particular light
of each (sub)-state authority. It is rare that experts emphasise the added value
for the “cross-border region” as a whole. Depending on their specific institu-
tional situation, experts interviewed seem to have different understandings of
the EGTC and its impact on cross-border governance:
● Experts working in federated states perceive the EGTC rather as a legal
tool, amongst others, whose added value is mainly to be able to associate
a state, such as Luxembourg.
● Experts working at the national level in Luxembourg emphasise the link
that the EGTC creates with the EU; it opens up new opportunities (e.g.,
visibility, agenda-setting at the EU level). There is also a concern that the
cooperation would progressively have to “label” itself towards EU goals.
In these particular cases, the EGTC appears mainly as a way of for-
malising the cooperation and of appearing on the European map.
● In decentralised authorities, conversely, the EGTC seems to change
their perceived relationship with the EU but also towards the other
(sub)-state authorities involved. It is seen as a possible strategy for
expressing typical cross-border concerns at the nation-state and EU
levels.
The interregional prism prevails: the EGTC appears as a tool for attempting
to twist the very specific power relation each (sub)-state authority has in the
cross-border, national and European context.
As a corollary, experts understand the EGTC as a way of increasing the
national and European visibility of the cross-border cooperation. Since it is
promoted by the EU and transposed into national law, the EGTC is perceived
as a tool that mechanically reinforces the multi-level interdependencies. On
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the contrary, few experts understood the EGTC as a supraregional tool: “We
don’t need an EGTC to write minutes of the meetings, to manage the commu-
nication and to liaise between the working groups. This is nonetheless another
story if is meant to support and implement the strategic vision of the Greater
Region” (expert interview). This minority opinion demonstrates that despite
being currently unused, the supraregional potential of the EGTC tool appears
as a clear policy option for some experts.
Notwithstanding its long-running cross-border cooperation (1970s) and
the recent establishment of two EGTCs, the cooperation in the Greater
Region remains mostly interregional. In a couple of years, however, the
decision-making process has evolved considerably. It confirmed the institu-
tional weight of the EGTC’s members, whilst avoiding blockage situations
and pushing for more strategy-oriented decision-making. While experts
perceive the EGTC’s supraregional potential, this instrument is currently
mainly used for related aims: formalisation, institutionalisation, visibility
and individual positioning at the cross-border and wider national and
European levels. In both cases, the EGTCs institutionalise the cross-border
cooperation, crystallising into law and enforceable convention and statutes
the previously negotiated but diffuse rules of the game. The future inter-
pretation of the statutes and conventions by the EGTCs’ members and staff
shall reveal whether this mainly interregional cooperation progressively shifts
towards supraregional cooperation. As a region under construction (Paasi,
1986), cross-border cooperation is a long-running process.
Conclusion
We opened this contribution with Perkmann’s analysis that cross-border
regions “do not appear particularly successful in constituting new, transna-
tional scales of governance”.97 Even if the EGTC does not seem to have a
direct impact on solving the challenge of developing a political legitimacy of
its own, it facilitates the emergence of an autonomous cross-border entity in a
capacity to execute measures (e.g., implementing a strategy, running infra-
structure) on behalf of its members. This tool consequently launches an
institutionalisation process through which an embryonic transnational scale
of governance is structured. (Sub)-state authorities can then use this platform
to develop a supraregional institution, hence supporting the construction and
the perpetuation of the region. The degree of “supraregionalness” depends
for example on the nature of the measures it executes, on the decision-
making process (e.g., majority voting) and its external visibility. Within
recent years, the widespread use (both geographically and content-wise) of
the EGTC has made it an unavoidable tool for practitioners interested in
territorial governance.
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Yet, when analysing how the Greater Region – equipped with 40 years of
cross-border cooperation – has implemented it, one can conclude that the
supraregional potential of this tool was, until now, mobilised in a limited
manner. The contribution demonstrates that – a couple of years after the EU
regulation entered into force – (sub)-state authorities grasp this tool for
many reasons not directly linked to the supraregional potential we identified.
Institutionalising their existing cross-border cooperation, going beyond the
“kleine Außenpolitik” and appearing on the EU map are key aspects. For
these laboratories of Europe, the national and EU scales continue to be
inevitable for solving concrete questions (e.g., transnational transport con-
nections) and acknowledging cross-border specificities, as the Lisbon Treaty
did in 2007. These “pragmatic” reasons seem to leave in the background – at
least for the moment and in the Greater Region – the use of the EGTC as a
supraregional tool, supporting the implementation of a cross-border strategy
visible to the citizens. Conceptualising the cross-border cooperation as a
region under construction helps to illuminate this paradox by emphasising
the long-term process through which this region emerges and is perpetuated.
The EGTCs are first interpreted in the light of each (sub)-state authority’s
positioning within the multi-level governance setting. Its legal features (e.g.,
legal personality) and its application mediated through the member states
contribute to reshuffling power bargaining across the levels of governance. In
this sense, the EGTC contributes to institutionalising a cross-border scale of
governance, used as a platform for negotiation and power bargaining both
within the region in construction and towards national and European levels.
The upcoming years will reveal how the EGTC Summit in particular98 will
position itself within the region in construction. Its “supraregionalness” will
depend on its capacity to operationalise – through its individual project – the
interests of the Greater Region as a whole. This is without any doubt a long-
term task, depending on the one hand on the vision and on the willingness of
the EGTC’s staff to engage in such an interpretation of the cross-border
challenges, and on the other hand on the readiness of the Greater Region’s
members to engage with the emergence of a supraregional institution –
embodying the interests of the region as a whole and not only representing
the addition of the members’ interests (interregional cooperation). The con-
vention and statutes of the EGTC Summit as well as the interviews conducted
show that the (sub)-state institutions involved have left the door open for the
concretisation of such a vision in the future.99 Yet, as demonstrated earlier,
this vision is currently a minority one. Its further concretisation might
depend on the evaluation of the EGTC Summit’s activities to be conducted
in a few years’ time.100
This contribution has concentrated on the potential opened by the EGTC
and on the political interpretation of this new institutional room for man-
oeuvre. Some academic studies have investigated how various individual
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daily border crossing practices in the Greater Region (for work,101 housing,
shopping and culture102) contribute to shaping a specific appropriation of the
cross-border space and a sense of identity,103 despite the limited visibility of
its political construction. As conceptualised by Paasi,104 the construction of a
region is a complex, multifaceted process involving a wide range of actors.
Both cross-border practices and the manifold cross-border functional inter-
dependencies demonstrate the need for further institutional cross-border
cooperation. The EGTC represents a significant institutional step to reinforce
its concrete identification by the citizen. In June 2015, the inauguration of the
“house of the Greater Region”, hosting all cross-border institutions in the
same place (Esch-sur-Alzette, LU), widely advertised in the local press,
demonstrated the attempt to increase their visibility. Again, the next few
years will reveal the effectiveness of such political wills in reconciling the
political construction with the citizens’ needs.
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